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█ Abstract In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos provides a 
new defense of the thesis that, unlike early vision, late vision is cognitively penetrable, in accordance with 
a new definition of cognitive penetrability that is centered on the ideas of direct influence of cognition 
upon perception and of the epistemic role of perception. This new definition allows him to maintain that 
late vision is a genuinely perceptive stage of the perceptual process. In this paper, I try to discuss not only 
whether this new definition has plausible consequences that allow only late vision to be cognitively pene-
trable but also whether the claim that late vision is genuinely perceptual allows it to have the kind of hy-
brid content, half nonconceptual and half conceptual, that Raftopoulos now wants to ascribe to it. 




█ Riassunto Penetralibità cognitiva e visione secondaria – In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of 
perception Athanasios Raftopoulos dà una nuova difesa della tesi secondo cui, a differenza della visione 
primaria, la visione secondaria è penetrabile cognitivamente, secondo una nuova definizione della nozio-
ne di penetrabilità cognitiva centrata sulle idee di influenza diretta della cognizione sulla percezione e di 
ruolo epistemico della percezione. Questa nuova definizione gli consente di sostenere che la visione se-
condaria è una fase genuinamente percettiva del processo percettivo. Nell’articolo, provo a discutere non 
solo se la nuova definizione ha conseguenze plausibili che consentono solo alla visione secondaria di esse-
re penetrabile cognitivamente, ma anche se l’idea che la visione secondaria sia genuinamente percettiva 
consente ad essa di avere il contenuto ibrido, in parte nonconcettuale e in parte concettuale, che Rafto-
poulos vuole ora ascriverle. 












*This paper is part of Book Symposium on A. RAFTOPOULOS, Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of 
perception, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. XI, n. 3, 2020, pp. 355-419. 
(α)
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell’Educazione, Università degli Studi di Torino, Palazzo Nuovo, via 
Sant’Ottavio, 20 – 10124 Torino (I) 
E-mail: alberto.voltolini@unito.it 




ATHANASIOS RAFTOPOULOS’ NEW BOOK, 
Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role 
of perception, is a great, amazing and articu-
lated fresco on the themes Raftopoulos has 
been working on throughout his philosophi-
cal career. The book is very rich, so it is hard 
to take into account in detail all the claims 
that Raftopoulos defends in it. I will focus 
only on two points, which seem to me the 
most relevant ones: a new definition of cog-
nitive penetrability (CP) and the role that 
late vision plays in perception. 
As regards CP, Raftopoulos wants to side-
step the problems that previous attempts at 
defining it have raised (e.g. those based on) 
(a) the causal dependence of perception on 
concepts, (b) the kind of conceptual percep-
tual content, (c) the informational resources 
of the cognitive system, (d) the consequen-
tialist role of the perception. In this vein, he 
initially offers two new criteria as necessary 
conditions for CP.
1
 Let us suppose, as is 
standardly the case at least from Pylyshyn 
onwards,
2
 that ordinary perceptual experi-
ence is subtended by a temporal process di-
vided in two parts, which, as far as the mo-
dality of sight is concerned, are respectively 
labeled early and late vision. This being the 
case, says Raftopoulos, perceptual episodes, 
in particular episodes determined by late vi-
sion, are cognitively penetrable only if the 
concepts that are mobilized by certain cogni-
tive states of the system – beliefs, cognitions, 
expectations: thoughts, to give them a tradi-
tional label – (i) directly influence such epi-
sodes
3
 and (ii) enable them to play an epis-
temic role, by allowing them to provide justi-
ficatory evidence, both in a positive, or up-
grading, and in a negative, or downgrading, 
sense, for the system’s further thoughts (be-
liefs first of all).
4
 To be sure, sometimes the 
two criteria are also offered as separate suffi-
cient conditions for CP.
5
 Yet I guess that 
such criteria are rather meant by Raftopoulos 
to provide both necessary and jointly suffi-
cient conditions for CP, once the second is 
taken to strengthen the first. In Raftopoulos’ 
words, «the extended directness condition 
conjoined with the revised epistemic condi-
tion yield a sufficient and necessary condi-
tion for CP».
6
 As a result, one may gloss, 
perceptual episodes are cognitively penetra-
ble iff they are directly influenced by the con-
cepts mobilized by some of the system’s 
thoughts insofar as such concepts enable cer-
tain perceptual episodes to play the above ep-
istemic role. The extended definition that 
Raftopolous provides in the book complies 
with the above characterization of CP.
7
 
For the present purposes, let me accept 
this characterization. In actual fact, pace 
Raftopoulos
8
 I prefer Macpherson’s account 
of CP.
9
 According to it, an ordinary perceptu-
al experience is strongly cognitively penetrable 
iff its content is roughly the same as the con-
ceptual concept of certain thoughts of the 
cognitive system, while it is weakly cognitively 
penetrable iff its phenomenal character is de-
termined by such conceptual content. For on 
the basis of this difference between these two 
forms of CPs, first, I can provide another no-
tion of CP, superstrong CP, defined as strong 
CP yet affecting not an alleged temporal part 
of the temporal process underlying a percep-
tual experience, but that experience in its en-
tirety. Second, I can use that further notion in 
order to qualify the CP that features, partly at 
least, a sui generis kind of perceptual experi-
ence, pictorial experience conceived along the 
lines of Wollheim as a twofold perceptual ex-
perience;
10
 i.e., a perceptual experience made 
of a configurational fold (CF) addressed to the 
physical basis of a picture, its vehicle, and of a 
recognitional fold (RF) addressed to what the 
picture presents, its subject. Third, armed both 
with the difference between weak and strong 
CP and the notion of superstrong CP, I can 
distinguish the CP of pictorial experience 
from the two CPs that affect ordinary percep-
tual experience with respect to the two differ-
ent episodes of its underlying perceptual pro-
cess, those of early vision and of late vision. 
With respect to such episodes, ordinary per-
ceptual experience is respectively weakly and 
strongly cognitively penetrable. Yet in pictori-
al experience, while its CF, is weakly (if not 
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superweakly) cognitively penetrable, its RF is 
superstrongly cognitively penetrable, as Woll-
heim himself originally suggested: «whatever 
role we might give to the role of modularity in 
perception, there is obviously a level of com-
plexity above which it doesn’t apply, and there 




Yet let me put my preferences aside. For, 
coming back to Raftopoulos’ characteriza-
tion of CP, I understand why he does not 
want to mobilize in it the notion of phenom-
enal character, even though he acknowledges 
that «cognitive effects in late vision modu-
late the phenomenology of the visual sce-
ne».
12
 For he is interested in a definition of 
CP that covers both conscious and uncon-
scious perception; indeed, the definition con-
cerns a perceptual state (whether it is con-
scious or not).
13
 Yet, Raftopoulos goes on 
saying,
14
 his definition entails that, given the 
same stimulus, it is nomologically possible 
for two people to entertain in their perceptu-
al processes different late visions with differ-
ent contents. However, he adds, this entail-
ment does not further imply epistemological 
relativism (or constructivism, as he some-
times labels it),
15
 i.e., the claim that one can 
perceive an object under a certain concept 
while another one can perceive that object 
under another, possibly incompatible, con-
cept, without no chance for this perceptual 
dispute to be adjudicated in one sense or an-
other. For, he says, the kind of negative evi-
dence that concepts may enable perceptual 
states to mobilize, by letting one perceive the 
objects as what they are not, may be alleviat-
ed. Thanks to the fact that early vision pro-
vides a cognitive-free evidence, the negative 
evidence that CP mobilizes can be cancelled 
by a positive one that complies with an atten-
tional refocusing of the scene perceived.
16
 
However, this sort of cancellation admit-
tedly takes place just in some cases of percep-
tual change; namely, when a perceptual revi-
sion occurs once one realizes that one was 
mistaking an object for something else (I say 
“admittedly” for in actual fact as regards per-
ceptual revision things are more complicat-
ed: see Section 2 below). So, to stick to the 
original Carneadean example (by following 
Siegel,
17
 Raftopolous discusses an analogous 
case
18
 in which one mistakes a pair of pliers 
for a gun), if there are two disagreeing par-
ties, one who says that she is perceiving a 
rope and another one who says that she is 
perceiving a snake, the dispute between them 
may be adjudicated once the second party 
realizes that she was mistaking a rope for a 
stake, thereby ruling out the negative evi-
dence that the concept of being a snake 
forced her perception to have.  
Yet, as Raftopoulos well knows, there are 
other cases of perceptual changes. For exam-
ple, the changes induced by multistable per-
ception, in which one may perceive an object 
now under a certain aspect, now under an-
other one. Normally, such cases are consid-
ered intrasubjectively, as switches concerning 
just one perceiver. But nothing prevents 
them from also be considered intersubjec-
tively, as mobilizing different subjects enter-
taining different aspectual perceptions – let 
me call them so, since in the intersubjective 
case no intrasubjective multistability is actu-
ally involved). So for example, imagine both 
a subject perceiving the scene containing a 
three-dimensional Necker’s cube as consti-
tuted by the cube’s having a certain protrud-
ing face and another receding face, and an-
other subject perceiving that scene as instead 
constituted by the cube’s having a different 
protruding face and another receding face. 
The two subjects actually face the very same 
three-dimensional scene, yet no one is right 
in grasping that scene one way or another: 
the opposite protruding-receding move-
ments that the two aspectual perceptions re-
spectively mobilize are merely apparent. (As 
Wittgenstein once famously said with respect 
to a two-dimensional version of the cube, 
«to perceive a complex means to perceive 
that its constituents are related to one anoth-
er in such and such a way. This no doubt also 
explains why there are two possible ways of 




phenomena. For we really see two different 
facts»).
19
 I make a three-dimensional exam-
ple of an aspectual perception rather than a 
standard two-dimensional one, for most two-
dimensional examples actually involve picto-
rial (ambiguous) perception – e.g., the per-
ception of a duck-rabbit figure – and pictori-
al perception actually is, as I hinted at before, 
a very complicated case of sui generis percep-
tion.
20
 In this latter, more standard case, a 
nice example of this situation would be the 
following. 
 
So, in the case of an aspectual perception, 
as regards neither subject the evidence in-
duced by her concept-dependent perception 





 these are the 
kind of cases that are standardly pointed outin 
order to prove that perceptual relativism sub-
sists. Pace Raftopoulos,
23
 in fact, as I just said, 
such cases are just intersubjective counter-
parts of cases of multistable perception rather 
than cases of perceptual revision. In the fa-
mous example from Hanson, did Brahe and 
Kepler irreducibly disagree in looking at the 
sky while being informed by their respective 
astronomical theories? 
Granted, Raftopoulos may first of all re-
ply that multistable perception actually in-
volves primarily early vision, not late vision. 
Multistable perception already occurs just as 
far as early vision is concerned, by mobiliz-
ing, for each aspect, a different non-
conceptual content (NCC) for the perceptual 
episode of early vision involved in it.
24
 
I agree with Raftopoulos that multistable 
perception primarily involve early vision. Yet 
this does not eo ipso rule out CP from being 
at stake with them as well, even if CP is char-
acterized as Raftopoulos wishes. First of all, if 
such cases primarily involve early vision, ear-
ly vision may also be directly affected by con-
cepts, insofar as they enable it to play an epis-
temic role as well. Multistable perception 
subtended by early vision seems indeed to fit 
what Macpherson
25
 calls the model of cogni-
tive penetration lite. According to such mod-
el, in order to entertain the relevant phenom-
enal change in a perceptual experience that is 
subtended by early vision, it is not necessary 
that one appeals to the relevant concepts. For 
the very same change may be grasped in an-
other similar perceptual experience inde-
pendently of those concepts’ mastery. Now, a 
Gestalt switch between the two aspects of a 
multistable perception subtended by early 
vision may certainly occur both if concepts 
are mobilized and if concepts are not mobi-
lized, as Raftopoulos himself recognizes.
26
 
Consider the case of the Mach figure. In the 
perceptual experience subtended by early vi-
sion, one can see the figure in two different 
ways both if one masters the concepts of be-
ing a diamond and of being a tilted square and 
if one does not master such concepts. This 
happens if simply alternates in one’s experi-
ence the two ways as mere optical, non-
conceptual aspects,
27
 those that would induce 
in pre-linguistic children mere primitive dif-
ferent reactions, as Wittgenstein himself 
glossed.
28
 If this is the case, then concepts 
may also directly influence a multistable per-
ception subtended by early vision, so as to 
make it evidence for further thoughts. 
Moreover, pace Raftopoulos,
29
 the kind of 
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attention that is involved in multistable percep-
tion can no longer be conceived as a particular 
form of spatial attention, which, as Raftopoulos 
himself stressed,
30
 may only work pre-
perceptually. Instead, as sometimes Raftopou-
los himself seems to be near to recognize,
31
 it 
must be conceived as a holistic form of atten-
tion that affects what is perceived as a whole.
32
 
Now, this is the sort of CP-based attention that 




Granted, Raftopoulos would further re-
tort that, in its admittedly mobilizing early 
vision, multistable perception differs from 
perceptual revision. For unlike the latter, in 
multistable perception different stimuli are 
involved, hence CP is not involved.
34
 
Let me agree with Raftopoulos that as re-
gards perceptual revision there is stimulus 
constancy, at least if by “stimulus constancy” 
one means the sort of images that impinges 
on the retina. Yet it is disputable that this is 
not also the case as regards multistable per-
ception. As Wittgenstein originally put it (in 
an admittedly clumsy way) by talking of such 
a case, «the colour in the visual impression 
corresponds to the colour of the object (this 
blotting paper looks pink to me, and is pink) 
– the shape in the visual impression to the 
shape of the object (it looks rectangular to 
me, and is rectangular) – but what I perceive 
in the lighting up of an aspect is not a proper-
ty of the object, but an internal relation be-
tween it and other objects».
35
 
At this point, Raftopoulos may put for-
ward a more general reply. Given his temporal 
characterization of early vision, taken as that 
part of the perceptual process that occurs 
roughly within 150 ms. from the stimulus on-
set,
36
 there is no enough time, he claims, for 
early vision to be conceptually affected.  
I do not dispute this claim, insofar as this 
is a merely empirical claim. Yet Raftopoulos 
flanks his temporal characterization of early 
vision with a functional characterization of 
it; namely, early vision taken as that episode 
of the perceptual process that mobilizes in its 
NCC fine-grained properties that are pre-
cisely not conceptualized.
37
 If one adopts this 
second characterization of early vision, in a 
perceptual process the relevant episode of 
early vision may still fall under CP defined à 
la Raftopoulos, at least if, as I said before, CP 
fits Macpherson’s model of cognitive pene-
tration lite: the episode may be directly influ-
enced by concepts, insofar as they enable it to 
play an epistemic role. 
Let me now pass to assess what I take to be 
the main novelty of the book; namely, 
Raftopoulos’ treatment of late vision. In a nut-
shell, this novelty consists in passing from con-
sidering late vision to be late vision to consider 
it as late vision. In fact in his previous book,
38
 
Raftopoulos took late vision to constitute an 
observational phenomenon that consists in the 
last conscious episode of the perceptual process 
conceived computationally in Marr’s terms;
39
 
namely, the conscious perception of a properly 
3D object. This episode must be distinguished 
from the episode of early vision that constitutes 
the properly perceptual component of the per-
ceptual process. According to Marr, this com-
ponent is determined by the two first uncon-
scious stages of the process, the primal sketch 
and the 2½D sketch. These two stages enable 
that component as a whole to grasp a proto-
object, in Pylyshyn’s terms.
40
 Yet now 
Raftopoulos takes late vision to constitute a 
genuinely perceptual phenomenon. In it, atten-
tion is still involved, as he said before,
41
 yet its 
role is no longer either pre- or post-perceptual, 
but, as I hinted at before, it is genuinely percep-
tual.
42
 As a result, even though, unlike early vi-
sion, late vision is still for him conceptually 
penetrated – in the sense provided by the defi-
nition he commits to – it has no longer a mere 
conceptual concept as he was ready to hold be-
fore.
43
 Instead, it has a hybrid content that is 
partly conceptual and partly non-conceptual.
44
 
One may guess that this is the basic reason why 
he refrains from adopting a definition of CP 
explicitly based on the idea that perception has 
a conceptual content conforming to the con-
tent of the system’s thoughts. Yet how does all 
this exactly work? In my reconstruction, ac-




First of all, the relevant perceptual epi-
sode of early vision possessing a certain NCC 
causally prompts the system to generate in 
late vision an individuating hypothesis about 
what is perceived. This hypothesis is directly 
influenced by a fullfledged conceptual con-
tent of the system’s relevant thoughts.
45
 One 
may take the hypothesis to have a sui generis 
structured nonpropositional both demon-
strative and conceptual content:
46
 something 
like that F, where being F is a kind of struc-
tured concept that may only occur in the 
content of the perceptual episode that corre-
sponds to early vision.
47
 One may take it as a 
concept for a merely perceptual property, as 
paradigmatically are the low-level properties 
of having a certain color and the property of 
having a certain shape. At this point, moreo-
ver, this content of late vision must be 
matched with the NCC of the perceptual epi-
sode of early vision as is stored now, i.e., at 
this moment of the perceptual process, in 
working memory.
48
 If the match is positive, 
then the system forms a recognitional belief 
that counts as the output of late vision.
49
 
This belief still has a demonstrative and con-
ceptual content, yet of a propositional form: 
something like that (thing) is a G, where G, 
unlike F, is a concept for an observational, 
not merely perceptual, property (e.g., being a 
pine tree, being an elephant). This recogni-
tional belief is dispositional, yet it becomes 
actual, i.e., an occurrent state properly en-
dorsed by the system, only once it is discur-
sively tested by means of a thought.
50
 In fact 
in its turn, the content of the recognitional 
belief still differs from the fully descriptive 
propositional content that is provided by a 
system’s thought: something like the H is a G 
(e.g., the tallest tree over there is a pine). 
If this reconstruction is correct, then to 
my mind this account raises a series of prob-
lems. First of all, in what sense can late vision 
formulate hypotheses? This gives late vision a 
sort of constructivist flavor that assimilates it 
to a form of theory. Yet hypotheses have a 
sort of theoretical nature that should make 
them conceived not in the perceptual part of 
the system, but directly in its imaginative 
part of the system, as a way for guiding atten-
tion,
51
 if not in its cognitive part. Consider 
for example the very basic hypotheses that 
according to Fodor
52
 are needed in order for 
one to learn a new language. These hypothe-
ses are thoughts of the form (“E’ (in language 
L) means M (in language L’)”.) Clearly, 
Raftopoulos may reply that these are uncon-
scious hypotheses affecting the subpersonal 
perceptual process that subtends to late vi-
sion. But this is not the point. The point is 
that, in affecting the piece of behavior that 
follows late vision itself, whether it is con-
scious or not, the relevant mental event in-
volved in late vision at this point of the per-
ceptual process must be something whose 
mode is not hypothetical, but doxastic. Con-
sider the issue of perceptual revision again. 
Suppose that at time t, in virtue of one’s per-
ception in early vision, in late vision one enter-
tains the erroneous idea that that thing over 
there is a snake. This idea is not a hypothesis. 
If it were such, one would never run away.  
Second, how does the match between the 
hybrid content of late vision and the NCC of 
the perceptual episode of early vision yet now 
stored in working memory really work, in or-
der for that content not to trivially pass al-
ternative yet incompatible hypotheses? For 
example, how can two alternative hypotheses 
whose content, as you may remember, in the 
case of perceptual revision respectively de-
termines a positive and a negative evidence – 
say, that rope-like thing and that snake-like 
thing – be differently tested, if, as we saw be-
fore, they face the same stimulus, hence pos-
sibly the same NCC of the perceptual epi-
sode of early vision now stored in working 
memory? Appealing to a refocusing atten-
tion, as Raftopoulos would certainly do (see 
before) is not enough. For the revision is not 
accounted for by claiming that one has 
missed a detail in the perceived scene that 
refocusing attention may enable one to cap-
ture, as in a sort of Blow Up- situation. For 
once again, attention must play a more active 
role. Indeed, it order to dispense with the 
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“bad” hypothesis and preserve the “good” 
one, one must check them not with one and 
the same NCC of that episode now stored in 
working memory, but with a new attention-
based episode of early vision endowed with a 
NCC that differs from the NCC of the epi-
sode entertained before. So, to come back to 
the rope-snake case, one may rule out the 
“snake” hypothesis once one notices that one 
is facing a ropish Gestalt (as constituting the 
NCC of a new perceptual episode of early vi-
sion) rather than a snakish Gestalt (as consti-
tuting the different NCC of a previous epi-
sode of late vision).
53
  
Third, how can late vision subsequently 
mobilize two different contents, a non-
propositional one (of the form, that F) and a 
propositional one (of the form, that is a G)? 
Qua content of a recognitional belief that 
works as the output of late vision, is the sec-
ond content not properly a perceptual content 
of late vision, but a mere observational post-
perceptual content actually arising outside late 
vision, what Raftopoulos originally supposed 
to be the only content of late vision?
54
 
Fourth, how can the output of late vision 
be a recognitional belief that is not yet en-
dorsed as such, if it originates from the 
match between the sui generis conceptual yet 
nonpropositional content of late vision and 
the NCC of the perceptual episode of early 
vision now stored in working memory? Ap-
pealing to the distinction between a disposi-
tional and an occurrent belief, as Raftopoulos 
does, makes no difference concerning en-
dorsement. I may now consciously come to 
entertain an occurrent belief that I have been 
entertaining dispositionally, say the belief 
that Pluto is round, and yet, by means of hav-
ing allowed that belief to enter the fore of my 
consciousness, my overall behavior does not 
seem to be modified, as it should be if that 
change affected my endorsement of that be-
lief. Hence, in order for the belief to be en-
dorsed, no further test with the descriptive 
content of thoughts seems to be needed. 
I do not think that the problems I have 
raised cannot be satisfactorily addressed in 
the framework of Raftopoulos’ new theory. 
Yet they hopefully show that the stimulating 
debate about cognitive penetrability, the 
process and the content of perception is still 
alive, and new paths can be followed in it. 
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